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Abstract
Using German panel data from 1984 to 2007, we analyze the impact
of labor division between husband and wife on the risk of divorce. Gary
Becker's theory of marriage predicts that specialization in domestic and
market work, respectively, reduces the risk of separation. Tradition-
ally, the breadwinner role is assigned to the husband, however, female
labor force participation and their wages have risen substantially. Our
results suggest that there are gender-speci¯c di®erences, e.g. female
breadwinner-couples have a substantially higher risk of divorce than
male breadwinner-couples. In contrast, the equal division does not
signi¯cantly alter the probability of separation.
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11 Introduction
In most developed countries, divorce rates have increased dramatically dur-
ing the last decades. At the same time, labor force participation of married
women rose substantially. The question to what extent these two devel-
opments are related has widely been neglected by economists. However,
Becker et al. (1977) already suggest a positive relationship between female
labor force participation and risk of divorce in their work on marital stabil-
ity. Their analysis is based on Becker's theory of marriage (Becker (1973,
1974)) that hypothesizes that specialization of the two spouses in housework
on the one hand and market work on the other hand constitutes the most
important factor to gains from marriage compared to staying single. There-
fore, the one with the higher wage earnings capacity should specialize in
market work, whereas the other one should specialize in doing housework.
Due to their higher gains from marriage, these specialized couples should
consequently have a lower risk of divorce than couples where both spouses
are employed.
In principle, the theory is gender-neutral. It should not matter whether the
husband or the wife participates in the labor force as long as he or she is able
to derive a higher wage income. Nevertheless, the breadwinner role is usu-
ally assigned to the husband. One reason is probably that, on average, men
still earn more than women. However, despite the high female labor force
participation and that egalitarian gender attitudes have become more com-
mon today, husbands are also still expected to take on the provider role for
his family by many people. Consequently, couples with a husband earning
less than the wife are more likely to be frustrated or to be subject to social
sanctions that in turn leads to a higher probability of separation. Moreover,
while we observe a higher female labor force participation today than in the
past, housework is still primarily the wife's domain (see e.g. Bittman et al.
(2003); Hersch and Stratton (1994)). If one spouse is exposed to the double
burden of domestic and market work, this additional stress and the lack of
spouse's support are also very likely to reduce marital stability.
Since the Becker approach implies some strong assumptions, bargaining
models have been proposed (e.g. Manser and Brown (1980); McElroy and
Horney (1981)). Usually, the division of household goods is not symmetric
2but depends on the two spouses' outside options and the relative bargaining
power. Both are largely a®ected by the individual's income.
Our questions of interest are whether the labor division between wife and
husband has any impact on marital stability and in what respect. Is special-
ization really stability-enhancing? If so, can we observe di®erences between
the traditional specialization "housewife, working husband" and the non-
traditional "househusband, working wife"? Does the modern equal division
imply a higher risk of separation? Previous empirical analyses by economists
and particularly sociologists are usually restricted to the impact of the wife's
income relative to the total household income. The ¯rst group of studies ¯nd
a positive relationship between this ratio and the probability of divorce, e.g.
Kesselring and Bremmer (2006); Liu and Vikat (2004); Booth et al. (1984).
That is, the higher the wife's income proportion, the higher the risk of sepa-
ration. A second group of analyses does not ¯nd any statistically signi¯cant
e®ect. Examples are Sayer and Bianchi (2000), Tzeng and Mare (1995),
and Spitze and South (1985). Concerning the behavior of German couples
only a few empirical studies exist that are usually limited to the e®ect of
wife's employment status (e.g. BÄ ottcher (2006), Ott (1992)). Hartmann
and Beck (1999) provide a more elaborated evaluation of the relationship
between wife's employment and marital stability. They conclude that it also
matters whether the wife earns more than the husband, and whether there
are con°icts about the division of housework or about time spent together.
Stauder (2005) instead concentrates on the e®ect of the division of market
and domestic work after childbirth. He ¯nds that marital stability is only
signi¯cantly diminished if the wife bears the double burden of market and
domestic work.
Using a rich panel data set from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
from 1984 to 2007, we try to shed new light on these issues. For our analysis
of divorce determinants, we use complementary log-log (cloglog) regression
models with couple-speci¯c random e®ects to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Our SOEP-sample consists of West German couples only that are
observed from the beginning of their marriage onwards until separation or
right-censoring. The analyses focus on the e®ects of labor division-patterns,
nevertheless, various other factors are also controlled for like the presence of
3children of di®erent ages or education that may in°uence the risk of divorce
as well as labor division patterns.
In order to test the e®ect of specialization, we do not just consider the wife's
labor force status. We de¯ne the wife's labor income as proportion of total
household income on the one hand and her proportion of total time used for
housework on the other hand as variables of main interest. As indicator for
market work, we use income instead of hours worked because we think that,
for our purpose, the economic success is more important than time used.
Moreover, it is consistent with Becker's household model.
Our results suggest that the labor division can have an e®ect on the risk of
divorce but specialization per se is not stability-enhancing. We rather ¯nd
gender-speci¯c di®erences. Couples with a female main earner and a hus-
band doing most of the housework have a substantially higher probability of
separation than couples with the traditional male breadwinner/housewife-
pattern. Marital stability is also considerably reduced if the wife has to
bear the double burden of market and housework which we cannot ¯nd if
the husband bears it. In contrast, the equal division does not signi¯cantly
alter the risk of divorce.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion about the
determinants of marital stability in the context of the two most important
theoretical frameworks. Section 3 reviews the relevant empirical literature,
whereas section 4 describes the empirical approach and the data we use. In
section 5, empirical results are presented. Conclusions are given in section
6.
2 Theoretical discussion on the e®ects of spousal
labor division on marital stability
There are two classes of theoretical frameworks modeling the decision-making
of a family. So-called unitary models or traditional household models assume
a joint utility function for all household members, whereas the second class
is based upon bargaining theory.1
1For a more detailed review of theories of family decision-making, see e.g. Bergstrom
(1997).
4In the following, the two types are shortly presented in the context of mari-
tal stability. Focus is on the models' predictions concerning the relationship
between the risk of divorce on the one hand, and labor division on the other
hand. Nevertheless, other factors are also discussed since they likely have
an in°uence on labor supply and wage earnings capacity, e.g. children or
education.
2.1 Unitary models
With his "Theory of Marriage" and later extensions (Becker (1973, 1974);
Becker et al. (1977)), Gary Becker provided a framework that is still the
basis for many analyses concerning the behavior of families.
The main implication of his model is that the family acts as if it were
maximizing a joint utility function that incorporates the preferences of all
family members.2 Utility only depends on household commodities like chil-
dren, love, and a®ection. They are produced within the household with
market goods and time of household members as input factors. Their pro-
ductivity is in°uenced by environmental variables like household's human
capital or individuals' health status. The model implies that two persons
marry when the expected utility from being married exceeds the expected
utility from remaining single. Analogously, married couples separate when
the expected utility from remaining married falls below the expected util-
ity from divorcing and possibly remarrying. One reason for this turnover
in expected utilities can be an unpredictable change in personal traits of
the spouse that may cause the partner to reconsider his or her marriage
decision. Thus, in such a stochastic framework, the probability of divorce
depends on the expected gains from marriage and the distribution of unan-
ticipated gains/losses from marriage. One objective of the model is to ¯nd
characteristics and spousal combinations that minimize this probability of
divorce by in°uencing the gains from marriage and their uncertainty. For
example, it is usually assumed that uncertainty is reduced by a longer search
duration on the marriage market. A longer or more intensive search should
enhance the match quality because an individual gathers more information
2In his work about social indi®erence curves, Samuelson (1956) assumed this behavior
for families already.
5about potential mates and own preferences concerning the optimal partner.
In empirical estimations, this factor is usually captured by age at the time of
marriage. A higher age at marriage should stabilize a relationship because
it usually implies a longer search history.
However, in his model, Becker emphasizes the expected gains from mar-
riage. They do not only rely on economies of scale by joining households.
The main factor is the complementarity of a man and a woman in the home
production of household commodities. Thus, these gains rise with increas-
ing complementarity of inputs, namely market goods and time. This implies
that the one with the higher wage earnings capacity should specialize in mar-
ket work so that the household can a®ord more market goods. The other
one should use his or her time for home production. This specialization gain
is larger the higher the wage di®erence between the two spouses. Moreover,
specialization implies a mutual dependence between the two mates. Accord-
ing to Becker, this aspect is the major incentive for partners to marry and,
in the periods following, to stay together. Thus, every factor that makes
the division of labor between husband and wife less advantageous decreases
the mutual dependence and therefore raises the risk of marital disruption.
Hence, negative assortative mating concerning wage earnings capacity (or
other factors that are close substitutes) is optimal.
In principle, Becker's theory is gender-neutral. However, the economic
provider role is traditionally assigned to husbands and the homemaker role
to wives. Consequently, the increase in educational attainment and labor
market activity of women can be partially responsible for the rise in divorce
rates in the last decades. By growing equalization of men and women, the
incentives to marry and if married to stay together are reduced.
The aspect of preferences concerning the labor division between oneself and
the spouse is problematic. Some may still prefer the traditional labor di-
vision, others may search for an egalitarian relationship, so that a priori
the impact of actually chosen labor division is not clear. Moreover, if the
choice does not meet the expectations of at least one spouse, because their
preferences do not harmonize or because of bad labor market and child care
conditions, the gains from marriage are reduced.
The Becker model considers children as marital-speci¯c investments that
stabilize a relationship. These commodities increase the gains from mar-
6riage since they make divorce more costly and thus, lower the probability
that it occurs. Nevertheless, it is often very di±cult for wives to re-enter the
labor market after childbirth, in particular given the small supply of child
care in Germany (see Stauder (2005)). This results in unhappiness about
the imposed labor division between her husband and her and thus, increases
the risk of separation. In this case, the observed specialization does not lead
to a higher marital stability but the contrary.
Becker also provides an extensive analysis of optimal sorting with respect
to other factors. He ¯nds that positive assortative mating, i.e. mating of
likes, is optimal for all other characteristics that are no good substitutes
for the wage earnings capacity. Hence, homogamy with respect to inter-
ests, age, etc. should stabilize a partnership. He further shows that, given
positive assortative mating is optimal, gains from marriage are higher for
persons with higher values of characteristics. The impact of education is not
straightforward. A good education improves the opportunities on the labor
market which in turn makes specialization less advantageous. Hence, high
education can destabilize a relationship. However, individuals with higher
education are supposed to be more intelligent than others. This might im-
ply that they are better able to form expectations about their spouse and
his or her future characteristics.3 Therefore, they are less likely to become
disappointed. An alternative interpretation is that they are better able to
¯nd a partner who is suited for lifetime. Both explanations imply an in-
verse relationship between education and risk of divorce. Hence, the e®ect
of education on marital stability is ambiguous.
Some of the main assumptions of the unitary framework are subject of crit-
icism. For example, it is not explicitly modeled in which way the individual
preferences are incorporated in the joint utility function, and pooling of
income is di±cult to justify if each family member has di®erent outside
options. Furthermore, in times of increasing education and labor force par-
ticipation rates of married women it is questionable that specialization still
(if ever) constitutes the most important part of the gains from marriage.
Nevertheless, despite their limitations, unitary models are still often used
due to their simplicity and less stringent data requirements.
3Thanks to Erwin Amann for stressing this point.
72.2 Models with household bargaining
The second class of models based on bargaining theory allow explicitly for
con°icts of interest and provide a mechanism by which family behavior is
formed from individual preferences. It is distinguished between coopera-
tive and non-cooperative bargaining solutions. Most popular is, however,
the cooperative Nash-bargaining model which we present in the following.
Some authors have questioned cooperative and have favored non-cooperative
models. However, in our opinion, if marriage is not suited for a coopera-
tive solution, then the Nash-bargaining solution may not be used for any
situation. Members of a family should be able to make binding agreements.
Nevertheless, Binmore et al. (1986) derive the Nash-bargaining solution as
the approximation of a non-cooperative game and show that this solution
has a quite general theoretical foundation.
As a solution to distributional problems between two players, 1 and 2, Nash
(1950) presented the allocation of goods (x1;x2) that maximizes the product




(x1 ¡ s1)¯(x2 ¡ s2)1¡¯ (1)
subject to
x1 + x2 = X: (2)
The parameter ¯ represents the relative bargaining power between the two
spouses, whereas X stands for the output of a marital production process.
The latter is de¯ned as the output of home produced commodities (e.g.
cooking, washing, child care) and consumption goods. In principle, both
could be measured in monetary terms but often the home produced goods
are not. The outcome in case of disagreement (si) is also called threat point.
The de¯nition of it is problematic and at the same time crucial for the out-
come of these models. In their works about household decision-making in a
bargaining framework, Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981) de¯ne the individual situation in case of divorce as the threat point.
Even though the credibility of a divorce-threat is questionable in day-to-day
8decisions its use in our analysis of divorce probabilities should be appropri-
ate.4 Non-marketable goods like trust and mutual support are not included
in X even though they are very important factors for a successful partner-
ship.5 It can be assumed that they either do not require time as input but
other resources or that the time invested in the production of these particu-
lar goods is not associated with disutility like working in the labor market.
Nevertheless, if these goods are absent, living together with a partner could
create a public bad instead of a public good. In these cases, a spouse makes
forecasts about the permanence of this situation and evaluates the utility
derived from monetary as well as non-monetary factors. Only if there does
not exist a monetary compensation high enough for the unhappy situation
marriage ends in divorce. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to monetary
(observable) factors but keep in mind the existence of non-monetary causes
of divorce.
Solving the above optimization problem with respect to x1 and x2 yield
that, ceteris paribus within the Nash-bargaining framework, the advantages
of being married compared to being single is:
x1 ¡ s1 = ¯X ¡ ¯(s1 + s2) (3)
and
x2 ¡ s2 = (1 ¡ ¯)X ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(s1 + s2): (4)
It becomes obvious that the di®erences between the monetary values of the
marriage and the outside options are determined by the relative bargaining
power within marriage. Labor force participation and the associated wage
income are usually regarded as important factor for the relative bargaining
power. They should also raise the threat point so that divorce may be
more likely if both spouses work than if one spouse depends economically
on his or her partner. Moreover, the threat point is also determined by
4Other authors, e.g. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) as well as Konrad and Lommerud
(1995), favor non-cooperative behavior within the household as the relevant threat point.
5Manser and Brown (1980) additionally include the partner's personal characteristics
to the factors that determine the systematic utility of each individual. According to
them, personal attributes of the partner like education may also a®ect the utility out of
consumption.
9the probability of ¯nding a more suitable partner than the current one. It
can be reasoned that a working spouse might not only have a higher risk
of divorce due to his or her ¯nancial independence but also because of a
higher probability to meet a more suitable partner. On the other hand,
employment of both spouses leads to a higher family income and thus, to a
higher systematic utility out of consumption for both. Thus, a priori, the
e®ect of labor division is not clear. Similarly to the discussion in section
2.1, the aspect of preferences concerning the labor division (as modeled in
Manser and Brown (1980)) is ambiguous.
3 Relevant previous literature
Our question of interest is related to the research on the relationship be-
tween female labor force participation and risk of divorce. This problem has
been discussed more extensively among sociologists than economists. Since
the associated hypotheses and estimation methods generally do not di®er
much between economists and sociologists we consider studies from both
¯elds in the following literature review.
From the international perspective, it is quite common to use the wife's in-
come as proportion of total household income as variable of main interest.
With respect to the estimated e®ect of it the analyses can be divided into
two groups. The ¯rst group consists of those studies that ¯nd a destabi-
lizing impact of female's relative income. Early examples are Booth et al.
(1984) and D'Amico (1983) (using wife's potential earnings). The second
group does not ¯nd any statistically signi¯cant e®ect of this ratio. Exam-
ples are Tzeng and Mare (1995), Bumpass et al. (1991), and Spitze and
South (1985). Tzeng and Mare (1995), however, ¯nd that a change in wife's
earnings raises the probability of divorce which cannot be found for changes
in husband's earnings. Similarly, Weiss and Willis (1997) suggest that an
unexpected increase in wife's wage earning capacity destabilizes a marriage,
whereas an unexpected increase in husband's wage earning capacity lowers
the probability of divorce.
Oppenheimer (1997) reviews the relevance of the independence hypothesis
which says that women's rising labor force participation has increased their
10¯nancial independence and has therefore reduced the value of marriage.
Oppenheimer (1997) criticizes those studies that have found a positive rela-
tionship between the wife's income proportion and risk of divorce. She states
that the independence hypothesis is based on the traditional gender-speci¯c
specialization and should not be relevant anymore for modern couples. How-
ever, some recent studies show the opposite. Kesselring and Bremmer (2006)
(using a sample of the US Current Population Survey), Liu and Vikat (2004)
(register-based data for Sweden), as well as Jalovaara (2003) (register-based
data for Finland) ¯nd evidence for the independence e®ect despite the fact
that Scandinavian countries usually stand for egalitarian gender attitudes.
The authors show that if the female's earnings become a larger proportion of
the total family income, the likelihood of divorce increases. This e®ect is not
compensated by the stabilizing in°uence of a higher family income. Only
Sayer and Bianchi (2000) con¯rm Oppenheimer's predictions after control-
ling for a huge set of indicators like demographic characteristics, children,
marital duration, time spouses spent together, and a gender ideology index.
Hence, empirical evidence concerning the e®ect of relative income is not
clear.
Regarding the behavior of German couples, only a few empirical studies
exist that can all be assigned to the German sociological literature. With
the exception of Hartmann and Beck (1999) and Stauder (2005), all studies
are limited to the e®ect of the employment status and refrain from analyz-
ing the di®erent aspects of being employed. Ott (1992) ¯nds a signi¯cant
destabilizing impact of female full-time employment for West German cou-
ples. Similarly, in her comparison of divorce probabilities in West Germany
and the former GDR until 1990, BÄ ottcher (2006) shows a positive relation-
ship between female full-time employment and risk of marital dissolution for
both countries. In contrast, Wagner (1997) ¯nds this pattern only for the
former GDR. For West Germany, there is no signi¯cant e®ect for couples
that married before 1975 and even a stabilizing e®ect for marriage cohorts
after 1975. Hartmann and Beck (1999) provide a more detailed evaluation
of the relationship between female employment and risk of divorce using
data from the Mannheim divorce study. They ¯nd that, controlling for her
labor force status, if the wife earns more than her husband marital stability
decreases signi¯cantly. However, by the inclusion of this dummy, the desta-
11bilizing e®ect of her full-time employment is reduced. Con°icts about the
division of housework and about time spent together also raise the divorce
risk but do not alter much the e®ect of female employment. The higher
propensity among full-time employed women to stay childless and to delay
childbearing, respectively, is another destabilizing aspect related to full-time
employment. Stauder (2005) concentrates on the in°uence of labor division
between the two spouses after childbirth. Division is measured in time used
for domestic and market work. According to his results, marital stability is
signi¯cantly diminished if the wife has to bear the double burden.
In contrast to the majority of the existing literature, this paper considers
not only the labor force status or the relative income but a combination
of the relative income and the relative time used for housework. Thus, we
include both aspects of specialization as modeled in Becker's theory of mar-
riage. Unlike Stauder (2005), we do not restrict our sample to the time after
childbirth and we use the ¯nancial aspect of employment, not the time.
4 Empirical approach
4.1 Complementary log-log model
Focus of our analysis is on the impact of certain explanatory variables on
the conditional probability of getting divorced, i.e. the probability of get-
ting divorced in time interval t given that the couple has not separated until
then. In most cases a proportional hazard model like the Cox model is
used for these kind of questions. However, for our analysis with grouped
duration data discrete-time models are better suited since they do not rely
on the assumption that at most one transition per period occurs. Several
authors have considered the discrete-time variant of the continuous pro-
portional hazard model (e.g. Kiefer (1988), Meyer (1990)). However, we
follow an alternative approach and use a binary choice model since Sueyoshi
(1995) has shown that the popular logit and probit models with period-
speci¯c dummy variables yield similar results to the discrete-time propor-
tional hazard model. In fact, the cloglog model is perfectly equivalent to
it (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005)) and therefore, we use this model with
12marriage duration-speci¯c dummy variables.6 The cloglog model is based
on the type 1 extreme value distribution which is asymmetric in contrast to
the logistic or standard normal distribution of the logit and probit model,
respectively. This asymmetry makes cloglog models superior for the analysis
of rare events like divorce.7 In order to consider the unobserved heterogene-
ity issue we estimate a random e®ects cloglog model.
Assuming a normal distribution, N(0;¾2




















1 ¡ expf¡exp(z)g if y 6= 0
expf¡exp(z)g otherwise:
The integral of the random e®ect component in our model is approximated
by using adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 20 quadrature points.
Re¯tting the model with di®erent numbers of quadrature points did not
yield substantial changes in the results.8
There is an intensive discussion on the e®ect of unobserved heterogeneity on
the estimation of duration models (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2005)).
It is shown that the coe±cients of the covariates are a®ected by it, however,
handling this bias is di±cult. Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2006) discuss the
random e®ects complementary log-log model that we use. They ¯nd that
this model is robust to a possible misspeci¯cation of the distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity.
6The addition of year dummies does not lead to any improvement.
7However, results do not di®er qualitatively if we use a logit or probit model.
8For more details about the approximation method, see e.g. Liu and Pierce (1994) or
in the context of random e®ects logit models, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008).
134.2 Sample
Our data is taken from the West German sample of the SOEP, waves 1984
to 2007.9 The advantage of this data is the availability of a rather long time
series of 24 periods and numerous control variables.10 We only include cou-
ples that marry during the observation period so that we are able to follow a
couple from the beginning of the marriage onwards until they separate/get
divorced (whichever is stated ¯rst) or until observations are right-censored.
In the following, we do not distinguish between separation and divorce and
use them interchangeably.
Even though it would be very interesting to extend this analysis to both
parts of Germany we restrict it to the West for two reasons. First, in the
former GDR it was a social norm for women to work even after childbirth.
Along with the ideological pressure, a low wage level, strong eligibility re-
quirements for widow's pension, and restricted possibilities to claim alimony
from the (former) husband in case of divorce forced women into full-time
employment (see Berghahn and Fritzsche (1991)). Public provision of cheap
and extensive child care for children of all ages made it possible to work
full-time even after childbirth. In contrast, in West Germany, the lack of
child care, incentives by the income tax system and stigmatization of work-
ing mothers have made it advantageous for wives to stay at home or to work
at most part-time. Therefore, it is not reasonable to pool West and East
German couples since the di®erences in female labor force participation and
provision of public child care have continued to exist even after reuni¯ca-
tion.11 Second, given our strategy to look only at couples that marry during
the observation period, the sample of East German couples is too small to
get reasonable estimates in separate regressions. Consequently, we only look
at the e®ect of labor division on the probability of divorce of West German
couples.
9The data used in this paper was extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0
Nov. 2007 for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P.
Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details.
The PanelWhiz generated DO ¯le to retrieve the data used here is available from us upon
request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own.
10For more information on the SOEP see, e.g., Wagner et al. (2007).
11For more information on family policies in West and East Germany, see e.g. Braun
et al. (1994); Cromm (1998); Kreyenfeld (2004).
14Another sampling problem is the treatment of the unemployed. In our
opinion, a speci¯c labor division induced by unemployment of one spouse
is a special case. Losing the job is usually an unwanted, negative shock
that a®ects the ¯nancial situation of the family as well as self-esteem and
self-con¯dence of the individual concerned. In order to avoid mixing up
di®erent e®ects, we drop those observations in which at least one spouse is
unemployed.12
We further restrict our data set to couples where both spouses are in the age
range from 18 to 65 at the time of marriage. Ultimately, the sample consists
of 1,128 couples with 8,758 couple-years and 204 divorces and separations
(see table 1). Hence, the observed probability of divorce is 2.33 % per year,
and 18.09 % of the couples ¯nally separate. We do not only look at ¯rst
marriages but remarriages as well: For 34.75 % of the couples, at least one
spouse does not marry for the ¯rst time.
Table 1: Transitions
State of Destination
origin Married Separated Divorced Widowed Total
Married 8,544 158 46 10 8,758
Figure 1 illustrates the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for the sample. It
estimates the conditional probability of remaining married by period t given
that the couple has not separated until t. We see that the probability of
remaining married decreases by about ¯ve percentage points within the ¯rst
three years of marriage. The largest drops occur between the years ¯ve and
seven, and years eight and nine. After a marriage duration of ten years, the
probability to stay together is 81.5 %. After the maximum observation time
of 22 years, the likelihood to stay married is still 67 %.
12Nevertheless, our results are robust to the inclusion of the unemployed.
























































We estimate the probability of divorce in period t given explanatory vari-
ables in t ¡ 1: Pr(yit 6= 0jxi;t¡1). However, we deviate from this de¯nition
regarding our labor division variables. Labor market behavior can be largely
in°uenced by the subjective probability of divorce (see Johnson and Skinner
(1986)). Therefore, we expect a change in working behavior in the preceding
years to divorce, in particular by women, if an individual already suspects
separation. This would be then a case of reversed causality which would
bias our estimates. For that reason, we use lagged variables of period t ¡ 3
instead of t ¡ 1 to circumvent this problem.
In order to ¯nd the e®ect of spousal labor division on the risk of divorce
we de¯ne ¯ve labor division-patterns depending on the wife's proportions of
total household income and total time used for housework.13 Therefore, we
13With this strategy we follow Stauder (2005) who uses time used for market and
domestic work, respectively, to generate ¯ve di®erent labor division patterns.
16¯rst generate the wife's monthly gross labor income (wage plus income from
self-employment) as proportion of the household's monthly gross income to
measure her economic success relative to the husband's.14 We think that
the ¯nancial aspect of labor force participation is in this case more impor-
tant than hours worked. Moreover, it is consistent with Becker's household
production function that de¯nes market goods, ¯nanced by wage income,
and time use as input factors (see section 2.1).

















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Wife’s income proportion
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the wife's proportion of the house-
hold's gross income. It shows that in the majority of observations the wife
14We decide to take the gross instead of the net income because of the special regu-
lations for married couples in the German tax system. If the gross wage income of both
spouses di®er, the one with the lower income (usually the wife) pays a relatively high tax
prepayment compared to his or her spouse since all tax allowances are assigned to the
one with the higher income. This reduces the couple's overall sum of tax prepayments.
However, it makes a direct comparison of net incomes unfeasible since they su®er from
a systematic distortion by the German taxation. For an example, see e.g. Bundesminis-
terium der Finanzen (2008).
17does not contribute any labor income to the household's income (36.94 %)
or only a small fraction. In contrast, in only 0.67 % of all observations, the
husband does not contribute. For 14.76 %, husband and wife earn roughly
the same, i.e. the wife's proportion is between 40 % and 60 %.













0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Wife’s housework proportion
As second element of labor division, we generate the wife's proportion of
total time used for housework. "Housework" is an aggregate that subsumes
time used for housework (in a narrower sense) and shopping, for child care,
and for crafts, repairs, and gardening.15 We prefer the aggregate to the
narrow de¯nition of housework since there may be an additional gender-
speci¯c specialization within housework chores which is, however, not part
of our analysis.
Analogously to gross income, ¯gure 3 shows the distribution of the wife's
proportion of total time used for housework. In this case, the distribution
has not such an extreme peak. The mode of the sample is the equal sharing
of housework (8 %). However, as expected, the wife's proportion is usually
15The SOEP asks for these activities separately.
18higher than the husband's. In 72.22 %, the percentage is higher than 60 %.
In 4.56 % of all observations, the wife is solely responsible for the housework,
whereas in only 0.37 % the husband is.
In a next step, we de¯ne three groups of wife's income and housework pro-
portions, respectively: The wife's proportion makes up 0 to 40 %, 40 to 60
%, or more than 60 %.16 Then, we combine these income and housework-
patterns with each other and generate ¯ve labor division combinations for
our regressions:
1. Traditional labor division: wife's housework proportion is larger than
her income proportion;
2. Non-traditional: wife's income proportion is larger than her housework
proportion;
3. Equal: wife's and husband's shares are virtually the same;
4. Double burden husband: wife's housework and income proportions are
both smaller than the husband's;
5. Double burden wife: wife's housework and income proportions are
both larger than the husband's;
Table 2: Income and housework combinations
Wife's income Wife's housework prop.
prop. 0.00-0.40 0.40{0.60 0.60{1.00
0.00{0.40 double b. husb. trad.
0.40{0.60 non-trad. equal trad.
0.60{1.00 non-trad. double b. wife
Table 2 illustrates how the nine possible combinations of wife's income and
housework proportion are assigned to these ¯ve groups.
16Our results do not change substantially if we use intervals 35 % to 65 % or 30 % to
70 %.
19Table 3: Descriptives of labor division variables
Variable No. of obs. in %
Traditional 7,187 82.06
of which:
Trad 1: wife's prop. = 0 % 3,209 36.64
Trad 2: wife's prop. < 40 % 3,978 45.42
Non-traditional 540 6.17
Equal 500 5.71
Double burden husband 236 2.69
Double burden wife 295 3.37
Total no. of observations 8,758
All variables refer to period t-3.
Table 3 shows the distribution of these combinations in our sample. For
82.06 % of all observations the traditional labor division can be found,
whereas the non-traditional and the equal one can only be observed in 6.17
% and 5.71 % of all couple-years, respectively. As expected, there are only
a few observations where one spouse is mainly responsible for both, earn-
ing income and doing housework. In 2.69 %, the husband bears the double
burden, whereas in 3.37 % the wife does so. The traditional pattern is the
reference group in regression (1).
Since the non-working wives constitute such a large group in our sample
we subdivide the pattern of traditional labor division. There may be a dif-
ference between wives that earn nothing and wives that earn at least some
money. Therefore, we di®erentiate between wives with zero income and a
housework proportion larger than 40 % (Trad 1), and wives with some in-
come lower than 40 % and a housework proportion at least 40 % (Trad 2).
Trad 1 is the reference group in regression (2).
204.3.2 Additional explanatory variables
In addition to the above mentioned labor division variables, we include a
set of important variables that are very likely to have an e®ect on the risk
of divorce. Some are also related to our labor supply variables. In the fol-
lowing, we brie°y explain their de¯nition, descriptive statistics are given in
table 4.
First, in addition to the wife's income proportion, we also include the house-
hold's total gross income to control for level di®erences. Two other impor-
tant aspects are education and the presence of children. Concerning edu-
cation, we follow Blossfeld and Timm (2003) and de¯ne three hierarchical
education levels:
1. "Low": No schooling degree or Hauptschul- or Realschul-degree, with-
out vocational degree;
2. "Medium": No schooling degree or Hauptschul- or Realschul-degree,
but with vocational degree or
Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, with or without vocational degree;
3. "High": University degree or degree of university of applied sciences.
These three levels should re°ect the main di®erences in labor market oppor-
tunities and earnings capacities as well as regarding their cultural resources
(Blossfeld and Timm (2003)). Moreover, the educational level also captures
(at least in parts) the preference concerning the labor division. Women with
higher human capital investments should be less likely to prefer the tradi-
tional division of work. Reference group in our estimations are low-educated
spouses, respectively.
The presence of children is a very important factor in the labor supply de-
cision of men and particularly women. Therefore, we include the number
of children of di®erent ages in our regressions. We distinguish between age
0{1, 2{7, and 8{15, however, we do not di®erentiate between own, adoptive
and children from previous relationships. Since there may be di®erences in
the supply of child care that in turn would a®ect female labor supply, we
also consider a dummy for living in a city center. Nevertheless, urban life
21may also increase the risk of divorce because of the higher probability to
meet a better match.
Additional controls are age at marriage, the absolute age di®erence, a dummy
variable if it is not the ¯rst marriage for at least one spouse, and marriage
duration dummies.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of additional explanatory variables (all
couple-years)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
For at least one spouse not ¯rst marriage 0.34 0.47
H: Age at marriage 31.92 7.96
W: Age at marriage 29.24 7.19
Absolute age di®erence 3.91 3.79
Live in city center 0.08 0.28
H: High-educated 0.20 0.40
H: Medium-educated 0.72 0.45
H: Low-educated 0.08 0.27
W: High-educated 0.11 0.31
W: Medium-educated 0.76 0.43
W: Low-educated 0.13 0.34
No. of HH members age 0{1 0.12 0.34
No. of HH members age 2{7 0.64 0.78
No. of HH members age 8{15 0.45 0.76
HH's gross income in 1,000 Euro of 2000 3.87 2.42
Total no. of observations 8,758
1)"H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives, "HH" for household.
2) All variables refer to period t-1 except household's gross income.
5 Results
Table 5 shows all coe±cients of our random e®ects-cloglog estimations. In
regression (2), we further distinguish between the two cases of the traditional
pattern when the wife has no income (reference group) and the wife earns
22some money (Trad 2). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Since we
estimate a random e®ects-model, table 5 also includes ½, the proportion of
the total variance that is contributed by the panel-level variance. It ranges
from 0.45 to 0.47. The hypothesis that ½ = 0, which would imply that
the random e®ects estimator is not signi¯cantly di®erent from the pooled
estimator, can be rejected on a 5 % signi¯cance level. In the following, we
will ¯rst brie°y discuss the results for the other control variables, and then
interpret the estimated e®ects of our labor division-patterns on the risk of
divorce in more detail.
Our results suggest that remarriages have a lower risk of separation than
¯rst marriages. However, the e®ects are not statistically di®erent from zero.
The same holds for age at marriage. As theory predicts, the coe±cients are
negative, i.e. the older someone is at the time of marriage, the more stable
the relationship is. However, as the dummy for remarriages, the e®ects
are in either case not signi¯cant. Nevertheless, the age di®erence between
two spouses is a relevant factor. Heterogamy with respect to age has a
destabilizing e®ect. Similarly, as expected, city life lowers marital stability
considerably. The e®ect of education was a priori not clear. On the one hand,
high education improves outside options. On the other hand, high-educated
individuals are likely better able to form expectations and have therefore a
lower risk to become disappointed. In our sample, the latter dominates, in
particular for husbands. Medium- and high-educated people have a lower
risk of divorce than the reference group of low-educated ones. The predicted
stabilizing e®ect of children as marital investments can be found for new-
born and small children, however, the latter is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero. For older children we ¯nd a destabilizing e®ect which we cannot
explain with a marriage duration e®ect since we include marriage duration
dummies in our regressions (see section 4.1). Maybe spouses do not stay
together just for the sake of the children if those have reached a certain age.
Moreover, household's total gross income has a positive but insigni¯cant
e®ect on the risk of separation.
Of main interest is, however, the impact of labor division on the risk of
divorce. We see that two patterns do positively a®ect the risk of divorce,
whereas the others only have a relatively small and insigni¯cant e®ect. The
23Table 5: Coe±cients of RE-cloglog-estimations
(1) (2)
Equal division, t-3 0.1868 (0.3004) 0.3691 (0.3335)
Non-trad. division, t-3 0.5525** (0.2735) 0.7277** (0.3082)
Double b. husband, t-3 -0.4541 (0.5311) -0.2607 (0.5530)
Double b. wife, t-3 0.7594** (0.3235) 0.9315*** (0.3532)
Trad 2, t-3 0.2599 (0.2009)
Not ¯rst marriage -0.0141 (0.2111) -0.0341 (0.2150)
H: age at marriage -0.0075 (0.0208) -0.0069 (0.0212)
W: age at marriage -0.0132 (0.0207) -0.0112 (0.0212)
Absolute age di®erence 0.0499* (0.0256) 0.0502* (0.0261)
Live in City 0.7948*** (0.2302) 0.8084*** (0.2333)
H: high educ -0.7021** (0.3540) -0.7113** (0.3588)
H: med educ -0.4656* (0.2665) -0.4826* (0.2702)
W: high educ -0.2981 (0.3895) -0.3265 (0.3963)
W: med educ -0.2569 (0.2353) -0.2697 (0.2388)
No. of HH members age 0-1 -0.8766*** (0.3074) -0.8652*** (0.3083)
No. of HH members age 2-7 -0.0762 (0.1200) -0.0216 (0.1271)
No. of HH members age 8-15 0.2405* (0.1266) 0.2558** (0.1283)
HH gross income, t-3 0.0447 (0.0334) 0.0386 (0.0349)
Constant -2.8445*** (0.6695) -3.1310*** (0.7195)
No. of obs. 8,758 8,758
No. of couples 1,128 1,128
½ 0.44872 0.47020
p-value H0 : ½ = 0 0.028 0.020
Log-likelihood -931.823 -930.969
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
3) "H": husband, "W": wife, "HH": household.
4) Results of marriage duration dummies not presented.
5) Reference groups: Low educated; Traditional/Trad 1.
24most striking result is that couples with a wife bearing the double burden
have a substantially higher risk of divorce than couples with a male bread-
winner and a housewife. Similarly, if the wife is the main earner and the
husband does most of the housework, marital stability is considerably dimin-
ished. If both spouses share equally the jobs of earning income and doing
housework, the risk of divorce is not substantially a®ected compared to the
traditional labor division. In contrast, if the husband bears the double bur-
den, marital stability is even enhanced, however, the e®ect is not signi¯cant.
If we further subdivide the group with a traditional labor division, we ¯nd
similar results for the ¯rst four patterns. The e®ects are, however, usually
stronger. If the wife works but earns less than 40 %, marital stability is not
signi¯cantly altered compared to if she does not work.17
Thus, labor division does matter but specialization per se is not stability-
enhancing. We rather ¯nd gender-speci¯c di®erences. On the one hand,
specialization has only a stabilizing e®ect if the traditional labor division
between husband and wife is chosen. On the other hand, if the wife bears
the double burden the risk of divorce is much higher unlike if the husband
does it. Given that about 2/3 of divorces in Germany are initiated by women
(see Bundesministerium fÄ ur Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2003)),
one could think that ¯nancial independence is a necessary precondition for
her to do so. Since the e®ect of "Trad 2" is not signi¯cant, her income must
exceed a certain threshold for ¯nancial independence. However, the insignif-
icant result for the equal division contradicts this interpretation. Frustration
of one or both spouses that the wife is the main earner and not the husband
as traditionally expected seems to be a better explanation for our ¯ndings.
Moreover, the husband's self-esteem might be adversely a®ected by her eco-
nomic success.
17If we assign those couples with wife's income proportion 40 to 60 % and housework
0 to 40 % or 60 to 100 % to the double burden groups, respectively, we still ¯nd the
destabilizing e®ect of non-traditional and double burden wife couples. If we separate
those of the non-traditional couples and those of the traditional couples who have an
income proportion 40 to 60 %, the coe±cients for the two non-traditional groups are still
positive and weakly signi¯cant. The lower signi¯cance can probably be attributed to the
small number of observations (366 and 174).
256 Conclusions
Using a rich panel data set of German couples, we test the hypothesis that
specialization in market work and housework, respectively, increases marital
stability. Gary Becker assumes that gains from marriage mainly result from
the complementarity of man and woman in the production of home com-
modities. Therefore, one spouse should specialize in earning money (tradi-
tionally the husband), and the other one should specialize in doing house-
work (traditionally the wife) in order to reduce the risk of divorce. However,
it is questionable whether this aspect still (if ever) matters. Nowadays, it is
quite common for married women to work in the labor market. Moreover,
some families rely on her income, at least temporarily, since job histories of
men are increasingly characterized by breaks with spells of unemployment.
In addition, only recently, German policy-makers reformed parental leave-
regulations in such a way that fathers have an incentive to take a share of
the legal parental leave. Thus, the traditional labor division with a work-
ing husband and a housewife should be less prevalent and consequently less
relevant for marital stability.
Our data set provides rich information for both spouses about e.g. labor
force status, income, children, and time used for housework. Hence, we are
able to test for the e®ect of actual labor division on the risk of divorce.
We show that it matters who does what. While the equal division does
not signi¯cantly alter the risk of divorce, couples with a female breadwin-
ner and a househusband have a higher risk of divorce than couples with a
male main earner and a housewife. Hence, specialization per se does not
enhance marital stability, only the traditional one. Marital stability is also
substantially reduced if the wife bears the double burden which we cannot
¯nd for husbands. Our results suggest that frustration that the wife is the
main earner and not the husband (so that the wife could stay at home) as
traditionally expected substantially reduces the gains from marriage.
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